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OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
Legislation: Sunshine in the Sunbelt: Oklahoma's
New Open Meeting Act
Introduction
Openness in government has been a widely sought goal of the press and
of various groups and individuals representing the public interest in recent
decades.' Federal and state legislation requiring governmental agencies to
hold open meetings is among the most important means to achieve this goal
of protecting the people's "right to know." Public awareness of and partici-
pation in governmental processes have long been viewed as essential to truly
representative democracy. For example, James Madison expressed this
philosophy in terms that dramatize the necessity of making governmental
functions visible to the public:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean
to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.'
Open meeting laws seek to expose to public scrutiny not merely the
final product of the labors of governing bodies but the decision-making pro-
cess itself: "If an informed citizenry is to meaningfully participate in govern-
ment or at least understand why government acts affecting their daily lives
are taken, the process of decision making as well as the end results must be
conducted in full view of the governed." 3 In addition, it has been argued that
open meeting laws, to achieve maximum effectiveness, should cover most
governmental entities:
Every meeting of any board, commission, agency or authority . ..
should be a marketplace of ideas, so that the governmental agency may
have sufficient input from the citizens who are going to be affected by
the subsequent action .... Government, more so now than ever before,
should be responsive to the wishes of the public. These wishes could
never be known in nonpublic meetings, and the governmental agencies
would be deprived of the benefit of suggestions and ideas which may be
advanced by the knowledgeable public.'
' See Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know, ' 75
HARV. L. RIv. 1199 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Note, Open Meeting] for an excellent discussion
of the role played by the press in the early efforts toward greater public accessibility to govern-
mental processes.
2 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (letter to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4,
1822), quoted in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 723 (1972) (dissenting opinion of Douglas,
1.).
, Oklahoma Ass'n of Mun. Atty's v. State, 577 P.2d 1310, 1313-14 (Okla. 1978).
' Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1974).
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The Oklahoma legislature first enacted an open meeting statute to
attain the goal of openness in government in 1959.' The Oklahoma Open
Meeting Act, 6 which became effective on October 1, 1977, replaced the 1959
statute that had been amended in 19677 and 1971.8 The new Act represents a
vast improvement: important terms are defined for the first time, 9 retained
provisions are clarified,' 0 provisions implied in the previous versions are
specified," and totally new provisions are set forth.'I This note will detail the
many significant differences between the Act and the former amended ver-
sion in effect from 1971 through 1977.11 The validity of cases decided under
the former statute also will be examined, and the cases interpreting the Act
will be discussed. Finally, the Act will be compared with the federal "Govern-
ment in the Sunshine Act""' and possible amendments to the Act will be sug-
gested.
Provisions of the Former Statute Retained in the New Act
The fundamental requirements of the present Act also were in the
former statute, which, like its predecessors,' 5 attempted to achieve broad
coverage with general language. As a result, the former versions were brief
and left many issues to judicial interpretation. In the new Act, the legislature
has incorporated the substance of the earlier language while supplying detail
for the sake of clarity and effectiveness.
The new Act has, of course, retained the general concept that all
meetings of public bodies are to be open to the public." The term, "public
body," is again defined in broad terms" but with several additions to the list
of specified groups.' 8 Voting must be in public sessions and all votes are to
be recorded.' 9
Executive sessions, that is, parts of meetings not open to the public, are
permitted for meetings relating to the "employment, hiring, appointment,
promotion, demotion, disciplining or resignation" 0 of any employee, but the
general requirement that votes be publicly cast and recorded applies also to
1 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 201, 202 (Supp. 1959).
6 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 301-14 (Supp. 1979).
25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 201 (Supp. 1970).
25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 201, 202 (1971).
See text accompanying notes 32-33, 45, and 49, infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 62-64, infra.
11 See text accompanying note 25, infra.
"1 See text accompanying notes 30, 34-41, 46-48, 65-66, 71-77, infra.
" 25 OKLA. STAT. §§ 201, 202 (1971).
.4 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976).
", Discussed in sources cited at notes 1, 2 supra.
11 25 OKLA. STAT. § 303 (Supp. 1980).
.7 Id. § 304(1).
"s Id.
19 Id. § 305.
20 Id. § 307.
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matters discussed in executive session. 2' Any legislative member who serves
on a committee with jurisdiction over a public body may attend executive ses-
sions of that body.22
The penalties set forth under the former statute have been retained,
with some modification. Under particular circumstances actions taken in
willful violation of the Act may be invalidated,2" and the individuals may be
subject to fines or imprisonment or both.
2'
New Provisions in the 1977 Act
Policy and Definitions
At the outset the Act succinctly states the policy behind the principle of
public access: "It is the public policy of the State of Oklahoma to encourage
and facilitate an informed citizenry's understanding of the governmental pro-
cesses and governmental problems."" The Act continues with many new
provisions, several modifications, and a number of definitions that attempt
to avoid vagueness and confusion.
The former statute had simply listed the groups intended to be covered.
The 1977 Act goes further. The definition of "public body" in the new Act
borrows heavily from the former language, e.g., "governing bodies of all
municipalities," "boards of county commissioners," "boards of public and
higher education," and "all boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies,
trusteeships, authorities . . ." have been retained together with the qualifica-
tion that these groups must be "supported in whole or in part by public
funds or entrusted with the expending of public funds, or administering
public property."' This coverage is quite expansive; bodies that would not
normally be perceived as public bodies are included because they are sup-
ported "in part" by public funds or entrusted with expending public funds."
Section 304 of the new Act goes even further, however, by including "coun-
cils, committees, public trusts, task forces, or study groups" within the
definition and by providing that all committees and subcommittees of public
bodies are included.28 The Act does, however, limit its coverage somewhat by
excluding certain groups. The term, "public body," does not include "the
state judiciary or the State Legislature or administrative staffs of public
bodies, including, but not limited to, faculty meetings and athletic staff
meetings of institutions of higher education."2 9 The remaining subsections of
section 304 provide a general definition of a "meeting" and then identify
21 Id.
22 Id. § 310.
23 Id. § 313.
I d. § 314.
2I Id. § 302.
26 Id. § 304(1).
Weis, The Oklahoma Open Meeting Act, 49 OKLA. B.A.J. 1515, 1516 (1978).
' 25 OKLA. STAT. § 304(1) (Supp. 1980).
29 Id.
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particular kinds of meetings: regularly scheduled meetings, special meetings,
emergency meetings, and continued or reconvened meetings. These distinc-
tions are significant with respect to notification requirements of impending
meetings that were enacted as part of the new law.3°
Notice Requirements
The requirement of notice to the public of all meetings covered by the
statute is noteworthy. Without knowledge of the time and place of meetings,
the public is unlikely to participate in a meaningful way. Thus, the notice
provisions are essential to fulfilling the statutory goal of public access. Re-
quirements of notice are so important that the Supreme Court of Minnesota
has held that they were implied in the open meeting law of that state:
The critical question is what constitutes a meeting open to the public, as
required by the statute. It is the judgment of this court that a meeting
of which the public is unaware is not such a meeting. To constitute a
public meeting, there must be adequate, timely notice to the public of
the time and place of the meeting. The statute itself does not expressly
require such advance notice to the public. However, the general rule of
statutory construction is that every statute is understood to contain by
implication, if not by its express terms, all provisions necessary to effec-
tuate its object and purpose. The language of the statute directing that
meetings be open to the public is meaningless if the public has no
knowledge that the meeting is to take place. Therefore, we believe that
the statute, by implication, requires adequate notice of the time and
place of the meeting. The mere fact that the meeting-room door is
unlocked is not sufficient compliance with the directive of the statute
[citation omitted].3
The Act carefully delineates the specific notice requirement for each
kind of meeting. In general a "meeting" is defined as "the conducting of
business of a public body by a majority of its members being personally
together." 3 With respect to regularly scheduled meetings, 33 all public bodies
are to give written notice of this kind of meeting for each calendar year by
December 15 of the preceding year. 34 These written notices are to be filed
with the secretary of state, 3 the county clerk, 36 or the municipal clerk,31
depending upon the type of governmental body.
30 Id. §§ 303, 311.
11 Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 217 N.W.2d 502, 505-506 (1974).
"1 25 OKLA. STAT. § 304(2) (Supp. 1980).
" I.e., "a meeting at which the regular business of the public body is conducted." Id. §
304(3).
, Id. § 311(1).
3s Id. § 311(2).
36 Id. § 311(3).




In each instance the official to whom the notice is given is required to
maintain a register of all notices received and to make this information
available on request." In addition to the advance public notice in writing,
twenty-four hours39 before any regularly scheduled meetings a public notice
is to be displayed at the principal office or meeting place of the public body
announcing the meeting and listing the agenda.40 Matters discussed at these
meetings are to be limited to agenda items and to any other items that come
under the limited concept of "new business.
'42
Circumstances occassionally will necessitate the convening of public
bodies to handle emergencies or to deal with other matters that may require
action on relatively short notice. The Act provides for both "special
meetings" and "emergency meetings," and sets notice requirements designed
to strike a balance between the necessity of action by the public body and the
policy of public access.' 2
The Act defines "emergency" as: "a situation involving injury to per-
sons or injury and damage to public or personal property or immediate
financial loss when the time requirements for public notice of a special
meeting would make such procedure impractical and increase the likelihood
of injury or damage or immediate financial loss."' 3 In an emergency situa-
tion the ordinary notice requirements are waived; the person calling the
meeting is required only to give such notice "as is reasonable and
possible.""'
For less critical situations, the special meeting is available. A "special
meeting" is defined simply as "any meeting of a public body other than a
regularly scheduled meeting or emergency meeting."" Notice of a special
meeting is to be given to the proper official" in writing, in person, or by
telephone, at least forty-eight hours before the meeting."7 The date, time,
place, and agenda are to be posted at the principal office or the meeting place
at least twenty-four hours before the meeting, and only those matters appear-
ing on the posted agenda may be discussed in the meeting. No "new
business" is permitted."
38 Id. § 311(7).
" Excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
40 25 OKLA. STAT. § 311(a) (Supp. 1980). Three recent Oklahoma cases have recognized
the importance of the posting of the agenda to the overall purpose of the Act. See Author's Note
following the Conclusion.
A, Id. "New business" is defined as "any matter not known about or which would not
have been reasonably foreseen prior to the time of posting."
"2 See text accompanying notes 43-48, infra.
" 25 OmLA. STAT. § 304(5) (Supp. 1980).
Id. § 311(12).
41 Id. § 304(4).
,1 As set out in 25 OKLA. STAT. § 311(1-6) (Supp. 1980).
11 Id. § 311(11). This subsection specifies that Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are
not counted in the provisions for posting twenty-four hours prior to special meetings. Apparent-
ly weekends and holidays may be counted in the forty-eight hours notice requirements.
4' Id.
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The final category of meetings is the continued or reconvened meeting.
Any meeting may be adjourned and reconvened provided the time and place
for reconvening are announced at the meeting being adjourned.49 A "con-
tinued or reconvened meeting," according to the Act, is "a meeting which is
assembled for the purpose of finishing business appearing on an agenda of a
previous meeting."510 Only items listed on the agenda of the meeting that was
adjourned and reconvened may be considered at the reconvened meeting."1
The precise language of this section appears to forbid the discussion in a
reconvened meeting of any item raised as "new business" in a regularly
scheduled meeting because the "new business" would not have been on the
original agenda. This apparent restriction may be desirable and more prac-
tical than first appears. The matters raised as "new business" in the adjourned
meeting could be addressed in a special meeting if necessary; notice of the
topics could be given, thus allowing for full consideration of the matter
within a reasonably short time without sacrificing notification to the public.
Prohibitions Against Circumvention
Another important addition to the Act is the prohibition against cir-
cumvention. Section 306 provides: "No informal gatherings or any electronic
or telephonic communications among a majority of the members of a public
body shall be used to decide any action or to take any vote on any matter.
'5 2
This section explicitly declares a policy that courts in other jurisdictions have
reached by statutory interpretation. A California court noted in 1968 that
requirements of prior open meeting statutes had often been evaded by
"unannounced 'sneak' meetings and through indulgence in euphemisms such
as executive session, conference, caucus, study or work session, and meeting
of the-committee as whole."" The court then declared that the objectives of
the open meeting statute dictated that informal gatherings closed to the
public be prohibited:
An informal conference or caucus permits crystallization of secret deci-
sions to a point just short of ceremonial acceptance. There is rarely any
purpose to a nonpublic pre-meeting conference except to conduct some
part of the decisional process behind closed doors. Only by embracing
the collective inquiry and discussion stages, as well as the ultimate step
of official action, can an open meeting regulation frustrate these
evasive devices.
5 4
This language was subsequently quoted with approval by the Supreme Court
" Id. § 311(10).
" Id. § 304(6).
"Id.
Id. § 306.
" Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal.
App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 487 (1969).
" Id., 69 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
1981]
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of Florida, which added that Florida's open meeting statute "should be con-
strued so as to frustrate all evasive devices.""
Section 306 of the Oklahoma Act removes any doubts about the appli-
cability of its provisions of "informal" gatherings. Some latitude for judicial
interpretation, however, may still remain in that informal gatherings are pro-
scribed only if used to "decide any action" or to take a vote."6 This raises the
question of the meaning of "to decide." One can argue that any informal
conference among a majority of members is prohibited. This is consistent
with the overall purpose of the Act. No motivation would seem to exist for
conferences if not "to decide" an issue or at least to make progress toward a
decision. Support for this interpretation of the statute can be found in a case
from the Second District Court of Appeals of Florida. Faced with a similar
issue in interpreting Florida's open meeting law," which, by its terms, ap-
plied to meetings "at which official acts are to be taken,""8 the court held
that:
[I]t is the entire decision-making process that the legislature intended to
affect by the enactment of the statute before us .... Every step in the
decision-making process . . . is a necessary preliminary to formal
action. It follows that each step constitutes an 'official act' . . . within
the meaning of the act. 9
Although Ihis precise question has not come before the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, an indication has been given that the justices are inclined to give a
broad interpretation to the phrase "to decide any action" and to interpret
section 306 liberally.60 Nevertheless, the statute could have been and should
be more carefully worded in order to avoid unnecessary confusion.
Exceptions to Public Meeting Requirements
The Act has clarified the purpose for which executive sessions were per-
mitted under the former statute and has added two new categories of excep-
tions.6 The language of the former statute (which allowed executive sessions
for personnel matters) evidently was the source of some confusion as opinions
of the state attorney general were requested on several occasions. 2 These opi-
nions held that the exception applied only to matters regarding individual
employees and did not apply to groups of employees or to independent con-
tractors.65 The new Act codifies these rulings by specifying that matters per-
" Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974).
25 OKLA. STAT. § 306 (Supp. 1980).
FL,,. STAT. § 286.011 (1975).
Times Pub. Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
Id. at 473 (emphasis in original).
10 See Berry v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists, 611 P.2d 628 (Okla. 1980),
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 135-144.
6, 25 OKLA. STAT. § 307 (Supp. 1980).
62 Weis, supra note 27, at 1519.
6, 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 3 (Okla. No. 75-102); 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 235 (Okla. No. 74-235); 5
On. Att'y Gen. 231 (Okla. No. 72-233).
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taining to "individual salaried" public officers or employees may be the sub-
ject of executive sessions.6 ' The Act provides that an executive session may
be conducted only upon a public vote by a majority of the present members
of the public body."5
A new exception to the public meeting requirement has been created for
district boards of education that are considering the expulsion or suspension
of a student, when a closed meeting is requested by the student, the parent
or guardian, or their attorney. 66 Another exception also pertains to district
boards of education. The boards are allowed to meet in executive session
when discussing negotiations "concerning employees and representatives of
employee groups. '" 7 This category (in contrast to that permitting executive
sessions for hiring, firing, or disciplining of individual employees in order to
protect reputations) allows closed meetings apparently for financial reasons.
Open salary negotiations might be injurious to the public by resulting in
disproportionately generous increases for the affected employees because of
the handicap to the public body of being unable to plan strategy in private as
employees' representatives may do. 68 If this line of reasoning is sound, and
support does exist for it,69 then it would seem to be appropriate for any
negotiations between public bodies and groups of employees, not just for
boards of education. Oklahoma grants the right to bargain collectively to
firefighters and to police 70 as well as to teachers. 71 No reason is apparent for
allowing negotiations with representatives of teachers to be in private while
requiring that negotiations with representatives of police and firefighters be
in public. If sound reasons do not exist for this distinction, an amendment to
the Act might be in order to reach a consistent result.
Legislative Exemption
Although the legislature expressly exempted itself from the provisions
of the Act by excluding the legislature from the definition of public bodies
7 2
the Act also directs that: "The Legislature shall conduct open meetings in
accordance with rules to be adopted by each house thereof."' 3 As the
legislature is the ultimate body "entrusted with the expending of public




6, See generally In re Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972), discussed in
Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In!, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 480, 491-92 (1973).
69 The court, in In re Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972), noted that the
lower court had the benefit of "impressive, uncontroverted testimony by respectable national
authorities in the field, that meaningful collective bargaining . . . would be destroyed if full
publicity were accorded at each step of the negotions." Id. at 426.
"o 11 OKLA. STAT. § 51-103 (Supp. 1980). See Author's Note following Conclusion for
discussion of a recent case relevant to this point.
71 70 OKLA. STAT. § 509.2 (Supp. 1980).
72 25 OKLA. STAT. § 304(1) (Supp. 1980).
73 Id. § 309.
1981]
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funds, 7' 4 it is enigmatic that the legislature should have excluded itself from
the coverage of the Act and its policies. Whatever might have been antici-
pated at the time of the Act's passage, the legislature has not to date adopted
rules governing public access to meetings of committees and subcommittees.
On the other hand, the legislature has sought to open up the governor's of-
fice by providing that: "Any meeting between the Governor and a majority
of the members of any public body shall be open to the public and subject to
all other provisions of this act."
'"7
The Act also requires that minutes be taken at each meeting that show
the steps taken to comply with the notice provisions, the members present
and those absent, all matters discussed, and, in the case of emergency
meetings, the nature of the emergency.76 The minutes are to be made
available to the public.17 Whether this section pertains to executive sessions is
unclear. Although the language appears to include executive sessions by re-
quiring minutes for "each meeting," one can argue that application of this
requirement to executive sessions is hardly in keeping with the purpose of
executive sessions, especially if the records are available to the public.
Remedial Provisions
Finally, the Act modifies the remedial provisions of the former statute.
The section setting the punishment for violation of the former statute was
never amended after its enactment in 1959.78 Under that section violators
would be guilty of a misdemeanor, subject to a maximum fine of one hun-
dred dollars, or a maximum period of confinement in the county jail of thirty
days, or both.79 These penalties are sharply increased under the current law.
The maximum fine is five hundred dollars and the maximum jail term is one
year. 80 Significantly though, both sanctions under the current Act may be
assessed only for willful violations."' Similarly, the portion of the former
statute that provided for invalidation of actions taken in violation of the
Act's requirements has been amended to apply only to actions taken in
willful violation.
2
Criminal penalties and invalidation have been criticized by commen-
tators as ineffective, or too harsh, or both. One writer expressed the view
that even modest criminal sanctions were too harsh because of the vagueness
and ambiguities generally found in open meeting laws. 3 Another stated that
the penalties typically authorized were too light to have deterrent value and
7. Id. § 304(1).
71 Id. § 308.
76 Id. § 312.
77 Id.
71 25 OKLA. STAT. § 202 (Supp. 1959).
79 Id.
1O 25 OKLA. STAT. § 314 (Supp. 1980).
81 Id.
32 Id. § 313.
11 Note, Open Meeting, supra note 1, at 1211.
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that careful research had failed to disclose a single instance in which a public
official had actually been sentenced under such statutes. 4 Furthermore,
Oklahoma's former statute was criticized for authorizing criminal sanctions
for any violations without regard to intent."5 These criticisms, however, ap-
pear to be inapplicable to the new Act, which is carefully drafted to avoid
vagueness or ambiguity. In addition, the increased penalties should have a
deterrent effect, and only willful violations are subject to the penalties.
Similar objections have been voiced to the invalidation remedy: "[T]he
deterrent effect of invalidation may seriously be doubted, for the officials
who violate the statute will seldom be affected by the consequences of such a
remedy."186 This view assumes an official disinterest that is probably not
justified. More to the point are arguments that invalidation is unduly harsh
in some cases because of an overriding public interest in the certainty of offi-
cial actions,8 7 and because reconsideration of a decision in a subsequent open
meeting may only result in an affirmation of the prior decision. 8 These con-
cerns raise valid questions that indicate a need for further consideration of
this section of the Act.
Effect of the Act on Prior Case Law
Under the former statute five substantive cases were decided by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.89 Two of the cases dealt with the general require-
ment of public voting and recordation of votes and appear to be unaffected
by the new Act. In one of the cases, a school board held an open meeting in
which the renewal of a teacher's contract was discussed, but the school board
failed to comply with the requirement of recording each member's vote.98
The court affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of the teacher and in-
validated the board's action.8 The vote had been by show of hands only and
confusion existed over the exact tally, though the outcome of the vote was
undisputed. The court rejected the board's argument that the oversight con-
stituted harmless error: "When the language of a statute is plain and unam-
biguous, no room for construction exists." 2 The only question raised by this
case in terms of the changes embodied in the Act is whether the board's
" Wickham, supra note 68, at 496. Since publication of that article, criminal penalties
have been assessed in at least one unreported Oklahoma case. And see Author's Note, following
the Conclusion, for another recent Oklahoma case.
" Note, Legislation: Oklahoma's Open Meeting Law, 29 OKLA. L. REv 189, 199-200
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Note].
,6 Note, Open Meeting, supra note 1, at 1214.
Id.; Note, supra note 85, at 198.
" Wickham, supra note 68, at 496-98.
89 This does not include one case in which the court simply ruled that an alleged viola-
tion of the open meeting law could not be the basis of an appeal where the issue had not been
raised at trial. Martin v. Harrah Indep. School Dist., 543 P.2d 1370 (Okla. 1975).
90 Oldham v. Drummond Bd. of Educ., 542 P.2d 1309 (Okla. 1975).
" Id.
'2 Id. at 1311.
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violation was willful. As this was not an issue under the former statute, one
can only speculate as to what finding would have been justified on that
point.
In the second of the two cases, the court did find harmless error when a
school board met in executive session to discuss a request to reconsider the
nonrenewal of a teacher's contract and, after hearing evidence from both
sides, the board returned from the executive session to announce that the
nonrenewal had been affirmed by a unanimous vote." Undoubtedly, a
technical violation of the law occurred by taking the vote in the executive ses-
sion, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed .with the trial court that
because all members were present in the public meeting when the vote was
announced, the purpose of the statute had been fulfilled: "The purpose of
the Open Meeting Law with respect to school boards is to require each
member to stand up and be counted so the public may know how he voted on
the issue. '
The result in both of these cases is sound. Although the error in the
first case was not substantial, the affected teacher was deprived of the
statutory right to know the position taken by each board member. The error
in the second case, however, resulted in no such deprivation, so the result
was allowed to stand.
Two other cases decided under the former statute dealt with sub-groups
of public bodies. The current status of these cases seems clear in light of the
modifications in the new Act's definition of public bodies." In Sanders v.
Benton,96 the issue was whether to invalidate the selection of a site for a com-
munity treatment center by the Board of Corrections because the board had
considered the recommendations of a citizens' advisory committee that had
not been formulated in open meetings. The court consulted cases from
several other states for guidance on the question of which subordinate groups
should be covered by the statute and which should be exempt. The justices
finally concluded that groups that are merely advisory should not be subject
to the openness requirements. 97 This issue would not arise under the current
Act. The definition of "public body" has expressed the intention of in-
cluding groups like the one in question in Sanders by inclusion of "task force
or study groups" 9 in the list of specified bodies, as well as by including "all
committees or subcommittees of any public body." 99 Therefore, although the
decision in Sanders may have been correct under the old law, the Act clearly
requires a different result today.
9 Graybill v. Oklahoma Bd. of Educ., 585 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1978).
9 Id. at 1360 (quoting from the trial court).
" 25 OKLA. STAT. § 304(1) (Supp. 1980). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has rejected the
author's rationale and has reaffirmed the holding of Sanders in a recent decision. See Author's
Note following the Conclusion.
96 579 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1978).
97 Id.
11 25 OKLA. STAT. § 304(1) (Supp. 1980).
99 Id.
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On the same day that Sanders was decided, the court reached the oppo-
site conclusion with respect to another subordinate group in Carl v. Board of
Regents.' 0 In Carl, the court unanimously concluded that the Admissions
Board of the University of Oklahoma College of Medicine was required to
conduct its business in public sessions.'01 The decision was based on the fact
that the board exercised decision-making power, not just advisory power.'"
2
The same result would be dictated by the new Act.
Although the current status of the above cases seems certain, the con-
tinued vitality of a fifth case, Stillwater Savings & Loan Board,'0 3 is ques-
tionable. At issue in Stillwater was whether the former statute applied to the
Savings and Loan Board when it was acting in a "quasijudicial manner."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has defined "quasi-judicial" in these terms:
"A quasijudicial power is one imposed upon an officer or a board involving
the exercise of discretion, judicial in its nature, in connection with and as
incidental to the administration of matters assigned or intrusted to such offi-
cers or board."'0 4 The court has also quoted the following definition for-
mulated by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
Every officer or board that is required, in the administration of the law,
to determine whether a duty exists, or determine from facts, by the
exercise of judgment, a course of action, within legislative restraints or
guides, must necessarily act judicially in a sense. The power often par-
takes so much of the judicial function that it is spoken of as quasi-
judicial.' 5
In Stillwater, the appellant, Stillwater Savings and Loan Association,
was contesting the action of the Savings and Loan Board in granting to the
Ponca City Savings and Loan Association a certificate of authority to
establish a branch office in Stillwater.'" In challenging the board's decision,
the appellant alleged that the board had violated the former statute by
holding closed hearings on the application for certificate of authority." ' The
court concluded that the board was exempt from the former statute's re-
quirements when holding this kind of session.' 0 '
In Stillwater the court first called attention to the Oklahoma Adminis-
trative Procedures Act of 1963109 and the Savings and Loan Code of 1970,"'
,00 577 P.2d 912 (Okla. 1978).
Id. at 915.
102 Id.
,0S tillwater Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Oklahoma Say. & Loan Bd., 534 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1975).
20, Board of County Comm'rs v. Cypert, 65 Okla. 168, 166 P. 195, 198 (1917).
,0s State ex rel. Ellis v. Thorne, 112 Wis. 84, 87 N.W. 797, 799 (1901), quoted in In re
Assessment of Kansas City Southern Ry., 168 Okla. 495, 33 P.2d 772, 776 (1934).
200 534 P.2d 9, 10 (Okla. 1975).
,a, Id. at 11.
201 Id.
200 75 OKLA. STAT. §§ 301 et seq. (Supp. 1980).
220 18 OKLA. STAT. §§ 381.1 et seq. (Supp. 1980).
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the latter of which states that the Administrative Procedures Act is to govern
proceedings of the board."' The opinion then noted that the Administrative
Procedures Act contains a phrase that requires that parties to a matter before
the board be notified of the board's decisions personally or by mail." 2 The
court concluded that the fact that parties could be notified by mail indicated
that although the board was to meet in public to hear arguments on each
case, the actual decision could be reached in private." 3 The opinion leaves
many questions unanswered because the court's reasoning is not fully set
forth. As a result, whether the passage of the new Act would sway the court
to overrule the Stillwater decision is difficult to predict. Furthermore, the
opinion does not touch on the question of whether the amendment of the
Open Meeting Law in 1971, subsequent to the passage of both other statutes,
affected the interrelation of these statutes.
The interrelation of similar statutes has been considered in Florida, a
state having a great deal of litigation involving its "Government in the Sun-
shine Act.""" In Canney v. Board of Public Instruction,'" the Florida
Supreme Court held by a four-to-three vote that there was no exemption for
quasi-judicial proceedings. The majority had the aid of a clear expression of
legislative intent because proposed amendments to the bill to create such an
exemption had been defeated.' 6 Nevertheless, a spirited dissent maintained
that due process required a "judicial atmosphere"" 7 of closed sessions. In
Stillwater, the Oklahoma Supreme Court chose not to avail itself of this
argument. If the justices had, the due process argument could be countered
by a 1977 decision of the United States Supreme Court."' In considering
whether procedures before administrative agencies violated the seventh
amendment preservation of right to trial by jury, the Court ruled that Con-
gress had absolute power to determine the method of deciding questions
under statutorily created rights."'9 This supports the conclusion of the major-
ity in Canney that the legislature does have the power to direct the methods
of procedure in quasi-judicial actions.
The intent of the new Act is clear. Section 307 declares: "No public
body shall hold executive sessions unless otherwise specifically provided for
herein.' ' 20 One could argue that "herein" could be interpreted to refer to the
Oklahoma statutes as a whole, instead of just the Act, and hence that the
reasoning in Stillwater, based on the Administrative Procedures Act, remains
"1 18 OKLA. STAT. § 381.5 (Supp. 1980).
112 75 OKLA. STAT. § 312 (1971).
"1 534. P.2d 9, 11 (Okla. 1975).
"' FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1975).
"' 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
16 Id. at 263.
', Id. at 264. The dissent does not specify whether federal or Florida due process is in-
volved.
"' Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
"' Id. at 450.
12' 25 OKLA. STAT. § 307 (Supp. 1980).
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valid. Although this argument might appear to be too attenuated, it would
have been preferable for the section to read "unless otherwise provided for in
this section." Because of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's use of policy
arguments to close deliberations in quasi-judicial proceedings, 2 ' and the
court's apparent failure to communicate clearly the reasoning of the decision,
one cannot say whether the Stillwater case remains authoritative.
Cases Decided Under the Current Act
Only two cases involving the current Act have been decided by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, but both raise important issues. In the first case,
Oklahoma Association of Municipal Attorneys v. State,' the court held that
public bodies may meet in executive session in consultation with their attor-
neys, but "only if the communications concern a pending investigation,
claim, or action, and disclosure of the matters discussed would seriously im-
pair the ability of the public body to process the claim or conduct the pend-
ing investigation, litigation or proceeding in the public interest."'2 3 As in
Stillwater, the court created a large exception to the Act by reference to other
statutes. The reasoning in the Municipal Attorneys case is clearer than in
Stillwater. The court noted that the 1977 Oklahoma legislature had passed
the "Privilege Against Disclosure Act,"'' 2 4 which, inter alia, provided that
public officers or agencies enjoyed a privilege against being required to give
evidence concerning pending investigations or actions if the testimony would
be prejudicial to the public body's ability to carry out the particular
activity.' 2 The court further observed the strong presumption against repeal
by implication of one statute by another when passed in the same session.' 26
The court concluded that by passing both statutes in the same session, the
legislature must have intended to create the exception for public bodies
meeting with their attorneys-an application of the specific over the
general. 
2 7
Although the reasoning in Municipal Attorneys is easily followed, the
rationale is not persuasive. Even though the presumption against implied
repeal is strong, the Act arguably bars all exceptions not specified in section
307. The legislature's intent in this situation is somewhat paradoxical; that is,
no reason exists for favoring the court's conclusion over the opposite result.
In fact, less support is present for the court's holding because one can argue
more easily that the legislature considered the Act as a whole with its express
2' The strength of this appeal can only be inferred; it is characteristic of the Stillwater
opinion that the court did not even mention policy considerations.
s 577 P.2d 1310 (Okla. 1978).
2 Id. at 1315.
12' This act was repealed in 1978 when the same language was incorporated into the
Evidence Code. It now appears as 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2501-502 (Supp. 1980).
125 Id.
577 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Okla. 1978).
227 Id. at 1315.
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limitations on exceptions, than one can argue that they must have considered
the interrelation of the Act with all other bills passed during that session.
In concluding that the result in Municipal Attorneys is less than per-
suasive, one should not forget that the policy considerations weighed by the
court include relevant factors that should be balanced. These policies were
forcefully expressed in a California opinion quoted in Municipal Attorneys:
Public agencies are constantly embroiled in contract and eminent do-
main litigation and, with the expansion of public tort liability, in per-
sonal injury and property damage suits. Large-scale public services and
projects expose public entities to potential tort liabilities dwarfing those
of most private clients. Money actions by and against the public are as
contentious as those involving private litigants. The most casual and
naive observer can sense the financial stakes wrapped up in the conven-
tionalities of a condemnation trial. Government should have no advan-
tage in legal strife; neither should it be a second-class citizen ...
Settlement and avoidance of litigation are particularly sensitive
activities whose conduct would be grossly confounded, often made
impossible, by undiscriminating insistence on open lawyer-client con-
ferences. In settlement advice, the attorney's professional task is to pro-
vide his client a frank appraisal of strength and weakness, gains and
risks, hopes and fears. If the public's "right to know" compelled
admission of an audience, the ringside seats would be occupied by the
government's adversary, delighted to capitalize on every revelation of
weakness. A lawyer worth his salt would feel a sense of treachery in
disclosing that kind of appraisal. (8 Wigmore op. cit. § 2291, p. 553).
To him its conduct in public would be shocking, unprofessional, un-
thinkable. He would prefer to fight the lawsuit to its bitter end.
Frustration would blunt the law's policy in favor of settlement, and
financial imprudence might be a compelled path.'
2'
The California court struggled to find a basis to justify an exception for the
attorney-client conferences and concluded that too little evidence was present
to support the position that the open meeting requirement had repealed by
implication the privileges found in the California Evidence Code.'
29
The relationship between open meetings and the attorney-client
privilege was considered with the opposite result in the Florida case of Times
Publishing Co. v. Williams." Florida's "Government in the Sunshine Law"
allowed exceptions to the open meeting requirements only where the state's
constitution directed."' Consequently, the court was forced to concede that:
"[T]he public, acting through the legislature, has waived the privilege with
12 Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal.
App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 490-91 (1968) (emphasis in original).
"I Id., 69 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
130 222 :o. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
13 Id. at 474.
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regard to the enumerated public bodies."' 32 The court, however, went on to
find that the legislature was without authority to interfere with the duties of
attorneys, the control of whom was solely vested in the state's supreme court
by the constitution. The court, therefore, concluded that an exemption to the
statute existed to prevent the attorney from being placed in the position of
having to violate either an ethical canon or the open meeting law. The ex-
emption was held, however, to be no broader in scope than required to allow
the attorney to follow the ethical canons and to exist only in favor of the at-
torney, not in favor of the client.'33
These cases illustrate the great importance attached to the policy
arguments in favor of allowing executive sessions for attorney-client con-
ferences. 3" In the final analysis, however, the policy considerations belong
with the legislature. If the legislature believes that the value of openness in
government dominates, this value judgment should be expressed more clearly
than the Act has done.
In the second case under the new Act, Berry v. Board of Governors of
Registered Dentists,' the court limited the holding of Municipal Attorneys.
In Berry, the Board of Governors of Registered Dentists had sought and ob-
tained injunctions against various denturists for allegedly engaging in the
unlawful practice of dentistry. 36 The denturists won reversal because the
board of governors had violated the Act when it initiated the suits., 37 One
board member and the board's attorney had signed the petitions. The board
contended that the informality of this decision-making process had exempted
it from the coverage of the Act. The court disagreed.' 3 In doing so, the
justices distinguished the Municipal Attorneys case,13 9 thereby clarifying the
scope of the attorney-client privilege with respect to the Act. The former case
was distinguished on four points:
(1) Although the Municipal Attorneys' case permits executive sessions
on the advice of counsel in certain specified instances, it does not
abrogate the statutory requirement that minutes be kept and recorded;
(2) An executive session of a public body is not permitted unless a ma-
jority of a quorum of the members present vote to hold an executive
session; (3) Even if an executive session is properly held . . . the statute
requires that any vote or action taken in an executive session must be in
a public meeting with the vote of each member publicly cast and record-
ed; (4) Informal gatherings among a majority of the members to decide
"Id. at 475.
Id. at 476.
",, Contra, Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968).
"' 611 P.2d 628 (Okla. 1980).
Id. at 629.
'" Id. at 632.
"'Id. at 631.
', 577 P.2d 1310 (Okla. 1978).
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on any course of action or to vote on any matter is prohibited by the
Act.1
40
The court added that: "It is not a proper function for the Board to abdicate
its responsibility for decision-making to its attorney."''
14
The significance of this case appears to be its conclusion that the Act
still applies to conferences between public bodies and their attorneys in that
final voting is still to be in public and a public vote is required to initiate such
a session. In addition, the court liberally interpreted section 306, which pro-
hibits circumvention of the Act. The fourth distinction made by the court in
the above quotation was not strictly applicable to the facts in Berry; no
gathering of a majority of the board had taken place. The fact that this pro-
vision was cited demonstrates that the court is willing to interpret the Act
liberally in order to eliminate practices such as the "informal" decision
making evidenced in Berry. 41 This would seem to indicate further that the
court's actions in carving out exceptions in the areas of quasi-judicial pro-
cesses and "attorney-client conferences," i.e., the Stillwater,43 and Municipal
Attorneys 44 cases, respectively, is more a product of the importan~ce given to
the policy considerations in those isolated areas than to any hostility toward
the alms of the Act.
Comparison with Federal Law
Comparison of provisions of the Oklahoma Open Meeting Act with the
federal Government in the Sunshine Act [hereafter referred to as the "Sun-
shine Act"], 41 is instructive. Three reported cases interpreting the federal act
held that the Sunshine Act was not applicable. Consideration of these cases
under the Ollahoma Act would have required an opposite result.
Hunt v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission'4 was decided by the District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma and thus has additional local
interest. The case grew out of the proposed Black Fox nuclear power plant
under construction near Tulsa. A citizens' group had pressed for release of a
report on the steam supply system to be used as part of the proposed plant.
The report was discussed in a closed meeting of the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board (ASLB), a subordinate entity of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). The plaintiffs' suit to enjoin the closed session was not
heard until after the meeting, but the court considered the suit on its merits,
1-0 611 P.2d 628, 632 (Okla. 1980). Two dissenting justices were of the opinion that the
Act was totally inapplicable when executive sessions were properly held under the attorney-client
privilege. Id. at 632-33.
1'4 Id. at 632.
142 Inexplicably the court invalidated the board's action without finding that the violation
by the board was willful as required by section 313 of the Act.
,41 534 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1975).
,44 577 P.2d 1310 (Okla. 1978).
14s 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976).
146 468 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Okla. 1979).
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holding that the possibility of repeated controversy prevented the issue from
being moot. 1 7 The court's decision, dictated by the clear language of the
statute, was that the Sunshine Act did not apply." 8 This was because under
the intertwining definitions used in the Sunshine Act, the meetings of the
ASLB were not "meetings" at all."19 Under the Sunshine Act, an "agency"
is an agency headed by a collegial body, the majority of whom must be
presidential appointees. 50 The NRC is an agency under this provision, but
the ASLB is not. A "meeting" under the Sunshine Act is deliberations of
members.' A "member" is a member of the collegial body."' Because the
ASLB had no NRC "members," it did not hold "meetings" as the term is
defined.5 3 This result illustrates the wisdom of the Oklahoma Act's com-
prehensive definition of public bodies and, in particular, of the specification
that committees and subcommittees are included therein.
Another federal case demonstrates the value of the Oklahoma Act's
prohibition against circumvention."' The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia was asked to review the refusal of the Federal Communications
Commission to authorize a radio station to change its operating classifica-
tion. '" The FCC's decision had been reached by a process called a "notation
process."'5 6 In this standard procedure, the FCC members received a
memorandum listing proposed agenda items. Each member either expressed
approval or disapproval of the proposed action or else requested discussion
on the item in meeting. If no member requested discussion, the action was
decided by the tally of approval and disapprovals received. The court found
that congressional history showed a clear intent to approve the continuation
of such processes and noted the efficiency afforded thereby." 7 Oklahoma's
section 306 probably would be interpreted to prevent this procedure in
Oklahoma.' One can question whether a great deal of time is saved by the
notation process. Because the items involved are seen as requiring no discus-
sion, they could be decided quickly in public sessions. Furthermore, one can
also doubt whether the exigencies of the volume of matters to be decided are
as severe in state agencies as in federal agencies. The unavailability of such a
procedure in Oklahoma under the Act thus probably results in no substantial
loss of efficiency and preserves the right of public access.
The third case under the Sunshine Act emphasizes the point that that
"' Id. at 819-20.
" Id. at 822.
"41 Id. at 820.
2,o 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1) (1976).
' 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2) (1976).
" 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(3) (1976).
' 468 F. Supp. 817, 820 (N.D. Okla. 1979).
"' 25 OKLA. STAT. § 306 (Supp. 1980).
"' Communications Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
2,6 Id. at 798.
, Id. at 800-801.
" See text accompanying note 141, supra.
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Act has no express provision for invalidation of actions taken in violation of
its requirements" 9 As noted earlier, the Oklahoma Act does have such a pro-
vision.'"°
On the other hand, the federal Sunshine Act also contains some provi-
sions that might be beneficially incorporated into the Oklahoma Act. The
notice provision of the Sunshine Act, for example, provides that the notice
shall include, in addition to the time, place, and agenda of the meeting, the
telephone number of a person designated by the agency to provide further
information on the meeting."' Probably most public bodies in Oklahoma
have staff members who could perform a similar service. The Sunshine Act
also provides that the public shall have access to the transcript, tape, or
minutes of closed meetings to the extent possible in keeping with the cir-
cumstances that required (or justified) the closed session." 2 In addition, the
certification of a chief legal officer is required to authorize a closed
meeting." 6 3 These provisions might help prevent abuse of executive sessions
and would serve to maximize the public's access to information.
Finally, the Sunshine Act authorizes any citizen to bring an action for
injunctive relief to enforce any provisions of the statute."' Injunctive relief
would seem to be an appropriate addition to the remedies specifically provid-
ed by the Act. Carl v. Board of Regents"5 may indicate that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has already decided that injunctive relief is available even
though it is not expressly authorized by the statute. The better choice would
seem to be to include injunctive relief in the language of the Act. In this
regard, a Florida court held that injunctive relief is constitutionally vested in
the courts of that state and that the legislature was powerless to grant or to
deny such authority by statute."' However, the court said that a statement
purporting to grant such power would be construed as a declaration that
violation of the statute was per se an irreparable injury, thus satisfying one
of the requirements for granting injunctive relief without the necessity of
proof. '61
Other Suggested Amendments
In addition to the modifications suggested by comparison of the Act
with the federal statute, other improvements in the Act should be considered.
One of the most compelling problems that could be resolved by amendment
"I Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Tennesee Valley Auth., 462 F. Supp. 464 (M.D.
Tenn. 1978).
110 See text accompanying note 82, supra.
161 5 U.S.C. § 552b(e)(1) (1976).
162 5 U.S.C. § 552b(f)(2) (1976).
16 5 U.S.C. § 552b(O(1) (1976).
5 U.S.C. § 552b(h)(1) (1976).
577 P.2d 912 (Okla. 1978).
Times Pub. Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
267 Id. at 476.
[Vol. 34
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
NOTES
is the question of the meaning of "willful" and "willfully" as used in the
remedial sections of the Act.1 68 The meanings accorded the term "willful"
span a wide spectrum; therefore, legislative guidance would be of great
assistance to the courts.
Initially, it should be noted that the Oklahoma Criminal Code, Title 21
of the Oklahoma Statutes, defines the term for purposes of that title in sec-
tion 92169: "The term 'willfully' when applied to the intent with which an act
is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act
or the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or
to injure another, or to acquire any advantage."' 7 This definition represents
one end of the spectrum.
The opposite end of the spectrum is represented by those instances in
which "willful" is construed to mean malevolent, malicious, and with evil
purpose. For example, an early Oklahoma case dealing with the term in
regard to its use in a manslaughter statute held that the term meant "with
evil intent or legal malice or without reasonable ground for believing the act
to be lawful."''7 Other cases, in other contexts, have held the meaning of the
term to include "premeditation, obstinancy, and intentional wrongdoing."
7
1
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit summarized the usage of
the various definitions in this manner:
In some penal statutes the word willful means that the offense must be
committed malevolently, with a bad purpose or an evil mind. These
offenses ordinarily involve moral turpitude but in those statutes de-
nouncing acts not in themselves wrong, such an evil purpose of criminal
intent need not exist. It is sufficient if the act was deliberate, voluntary
and intentional as distinguished from one committed through inad-
vertence, accidentally or by ordinary negligence.'
7 3
However, in going outside the area of criminal law where the statutory
definition is not required to be used, it is difficult to predict whether the
courts will lean toward the direction of a meaning equivalent to mere volun-
tariness or toward a meaning encompassing evil intent. Shields v. State'74 was
a civil action for the removal of a county sheriff from office for neglect of
" ' Section 313 provides for invalidation of actions taken in willful violation of theAct; §
314 provides criminal sanctions for persons willfully violating the Act. In recent decisions the
courts have been forced to provide their own definition of "willful." See Author's Note follow-
ing the Conclusion for discussion of these cases.
169 21 OKLA. STAT. § 91 (1971) states that the definition in § 92 applies only to Title 21.
1,0 21 OKLA. STAT. § 92 (Supp. 1980).
Miller v. State, 3 Okla. Crim. 575, 107 P. 948 (1910) (the court was quoting from
earlier cases).
" U.S. Zinc Co. v. Ross, 87 Okla. 21, 23, 208 P. 805, 807 (1922); Wick v. Gunn, 66
Okla. 316, 317, 169 P. 1087 (1917) (the Wick case includes extensive discussion on the meanings
of "willful.")
"I Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 480 (10th Cir. 1951).
,71 84 Okla. 618, 89 P.2d 756 (1939).
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duty. The court concluded, after extensive discussion, that the definition
applicable in such actions should be one that required a showing of wrongful
motive: "[All willful neglect of duty means that the act or failure to act was
for a bad or evil purpose .... [T]he officer ... must be guilty of some con-
scious wrong or inexcusable carelessness or recklessness. . . . Mere
thoughtless acts, with no bad or evil purpose . . . will not justify a
removal." " On the other hand, the court more recently concluded that the
criminal code definition'1 6 should be applied to "willfully" as used in a bail-
jumping statute 77 even though it is outside the official scope of the statutory
definition. 
78
These cases illustrate that confusion is invited because the statute is
silent as to the intended meaning of this term. An amendment supplying
guidance in this area is appropriate.
Several other improvements have been suggested throughout this note,
many of which appear minor but that could prove to have significance. Sec-
tion 306 of the Act, which prohibits circumvention of the requirements of the
Act, should plainly include deliberations of a majority as well as actual deci-
sions. Executive sessions for contract negotiations with representatives of
employee groups should be available in dealing with public employees other
than school employees. The right of access to minutes of executive sessions
should be clarified, preferably by allowing access to such portions of the
minutes as might be consistent with the purpose for which the meeting was
closed.
More important, the invalidation remedy should be restricted so as to
be available only on prompt complaint in the interest of insuring the reliabil-
ity of governmental decisions. Injunctive relief should be made expressly
available on the complaint of any citizen. Finally, in light of the attorney-
client exception created by the court in Municipal Attorneys, the legislature
should affirmatively indicate its intent that the listed grounds for executive
sessions are inclusive. Such an addition would also serve as an explicit rejec-
tion of the quasi-judicial exception created in Stillwater.'8
Conclusion
The new Oklahoma Open Meeting Act represents a vast improvement
over its predecessors. The Act seeks to realize the vital goal of making
government accountable to the governed to the fullest extent practicable. It
defines those groups whose meetings will be covered by the Act in very broad
terms: committees, subcommittees, study groups, groups supported in whole
"I Id., 89 P.2d at 760, quoting from Phillips v. State, 75 Okla. 46, 181 P. 713 (1919).
76 21 OKLA. STAT. § 92 (Supp. 1980).
177 59 OKLA. STAT. § 1335 (Supp. 1980).
" Parrolt v. State, 522 P.2d 635 (Okla. Cr. App. 1974).
17 577 P.2d 1310 (Okla. 1978).
"1 534 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1975).
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or in part by public funds, and so on. Compliance with the Act is sought to
be achieved by potential invalidation of actions, by criminal penalties, and by
prohibition of informal procedures designed to circumvent the Act.
In spite of the great effort that obviously was devoted to assuring com-
pliance, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has already ruled that the attorney-
client privilege, under particular circumstances, is not covered by the Act;
therefore, the possibility remains that the inclusiveness of the Act will be fur-
ther eroded by subsequent judicial interpretation, including the possibility
that the justices may continue to recognize an exception for quasi-judicial
proceedings, which the court found under the former statute. As a conse-
quence, the Act may need to be amended to be even more explicit. On the
other hand, because the court responded to weighty considerations of policy
as well as to subtleties of argument, the court's opinions may have found
favor with many legislators. If, as a result, the legislature decides to let the
Act stand as written, the public will still be well served: access to most
government proceedings is now assured, and the court in its most recent in-
terpretations of the Act has shown a tendency to broaden the scope of its
provisions.
Author's Note: Oklahoma courts recently have decided four cases
under the Act that relate to issues raised in this note. Probably the most im-
portant of these is International Assoc. of Firefighters, Local 2479 v.
Thorpe,"' in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that the Act did
not require that negotiations between the bargaining agent of the firefighters'
union and a city manager be conducted in public. As discussed above,
negotiations with agents representing groups of teachers are excluded from
the Act's requirements by specific language, and compelling policy
arguments can be advanced for broadening this exception.'8 " The Firefighters
case has done much more than that; this decision creates a significant excep-
tion to the Act and arguably reverses a policy judgment of the legislature in
the process. In Firefighters the court unanimously held that the Act does not
apply to "committees," "task forces," or "study groups" (terms specifically
included in the definition of "public body" in section 304(a)(1)) that do not ex-
ercise decision-making power."13 This reaffirmed the rule of Sanders, decided
under the former statute."'
In deciding that the legislature did not intend to extend the coverage of
the Act to groups not having decision-making power, Justice Doolin's opin-
ion relied on legislative history. The house of representatives had rejected
senate language that expressly included "advisory groups," inter alia, in the
definition of "public body."'" The court found this to be adequate evidence
"1B 52 OKLA. B.J. 1884 (Aug. 1, 1981).
IU See text accompanying notes 66-71 supra.
"' 52 OKLA. B.J. 1884, 1885 (Aug. 1, 1981).
,,4 See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
"1 52 OKLA. B.J. 1884, 1886 (Aug. 1, 1981).
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of legislative intent to leave the Sanders rule untouched. Although the policy
arguments for allowing private negotiations may be valid and persuasive, the
approach taken in Firefighters is open to question.
The well-established rule is that a court resorts to statutory construction
only to resolve ambiguities. 86 The edict of the Act is plainly not ambigu-
ous-meetings of public bodies are to be public meetings. For what purpose,
then, did the court inquire into the legislative history? No difficulty was per-
ceived in defining terms; to the contrary, broad definitions were adopted to
determine that the group composed of the city manager and the bargaining
agent was included under the Act as a "committee," "task force," or "study
group," even though it arguably did not fit the usual or traditional definition
of any one of those terms.' 7 In so holding, the justices echoed decisions of
other states that called for liberal construction of statutes that were enacted
for the public's benefit.' 8 ' Yet the court proceeded to take away with one
hand what it had given with the other, by deciding that the legislative history
supported the affirmation of the Sanders rule. If a group is a public body,
the Act clearly requires meetings of that group to be in public, unless within
one of the limited exceptions. The legislative history might have been proper-
ly consulted had the problem been defined as an ambiguity in the meanings
of terms such as "study group," but it was completely unnecessary after the
court had found the group in question to be a public body.
Moreover, although some evidence of legislative intent is provided by
the rejected language cited in the opinion, the inclusion of "study groups" in
the definition of public body is also evidence of legislative intent. The term
"study group" does not ordinarily connote a decision-making group."89 Thus
the attempt to fathom the purpose of the legislators may have frustrated
rather than furthered their goals. The resurrected Sanders rule extends far
beyond the area of collective bargaining and probably creates the largest
single exception to the Act's coverage.
Each of the other three decisions"' recently announced interprets the
term "willful."' 9' Although the language in the cases differs, the consensus
clearly is that the term will be given a broad definition. The court of appeals
said: "[W]e define the term 'willful' to include any act or omission which has
"86 Estate of Kasishke v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 541 P.2d 848 (Okla. 1975); Johnson v.
Ward, 541 P.2d 182 (Okla. 1975). See also Udall v. Udall, 613 P.2d 472 (Okla. 1980) ("Excep-
tions should not be read into a statute which are not made by the legislative body.").
117 52 OKLA. B.J. 1884, 1885 (Aug. 1, 1981).
"'s Id.
199 "Study group" is defined as "a group of people joining in the study of a particular
topic and usually meeting at scheduled intervals to discuss individual observations, reading, and
research." WEBS TER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2269 (1976).
11* Hilliary v. State, 630 P.2d 791 (Okla. Cr. App. 1981); Haworth Bd. of Educ. v.
Havens, 52 OKLA. B.J. 1978 (Sept. 12, 1981) (petition for certiorari to Oklahoma Supreme
Court was pending at time of publication); In re Appeal From Order Declaring Annexation, 52
OKLA. B.J. 1981 (Sept. 12, 1981) (petition for rehearing was pending at publication).
" See text accompanying notes 168-178 supra.
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